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Abstract-Reputation systems provide mechanisms through 
which multiple parties can quantify the trust between one 
another. These systems seek to generate an accurate assessment 
in the face of unprecedented community size, while providing 
anonymity and resilience to malicious attacks. 
We focus on attacks and defense mechanisms in reputation 
systems. We present an analysis framework that allows for 
general decomposition of existing reputation systems. We classify 
attacks against reputation systems by identifying which system 
components and design choices are the target of attacks. We sur- 
vey defense mechanisms employed by existing reputation systems. 
Finally, we analyze several landmark systems, characterizing 
their individual strengths and weaknesses. Our work contributes 
to understanding 1) which design components of reputation 
systems are most vulnerable, 2) what are the most appropriate 
defense mechanisms and 3) how these defense mechanisms can 
be integrated into existing or future reputation systems to make 
them resilient to attacks. 
General Terms: (1) Design; (2) Reliability; (3) Security; (4) 
Theory 
Keywords: reputation, trust, incentives, peer-to-peer, attacks, 
collusion, attack mitigation, defense techniques 
The rapid growth of communication networks such as the 
Internet and ad hoc wireless mesh networks has spurred the 
development of numerous collaborative applications. Repu- 
tation and trust play a pivotal role in such applications by 
enabling multiple parties to establish relationships that achieve 
mutual benefit. In general, reputation is the opinion of the 
public toward a person, a group of people, or an organization. 
In the context of collaborative applications such as peer-to- 
peer systems, reputation represents the opinions nodes in the 
system have about their peers. Reputation allows parties to 
build trust, or the degree to which one party has confidence in 
another within the context of a given purpose or decision. By 
harnessing the community knowledge in the form of feedback, 
reputation-based trust systems help participants decide who 
to trust, encourage trustworthy behavior, and deter dishonest 
participation by providing a means through which reputation 
and ultimately trust can be quantified and disseminated [I]. 
Without such mechanisms, opportunism can erode the foun- 
dations of these collaborative applications and lead to peer 
mistrust and eventual system failure [2]. 
A rich variety of environments and applications has mo- 
tivated research in reputation systems. Within the context of 
peer-to-peer ecomrnerce interactions such as eBay, Amazon, 
uBid, and Yahoo, recent research has shown that reputation 
systems facilitate fraud avoidance and better buyer satisfaction 
[3], [4], [5], [6]. Not only do reputation systems help protect 
the buyer, they have also been shown to reduce transaction- 
specific risks and therefore generate price premiums for rep- 
utable sellers [7]. More recently, reputation systems have been 
proposed as a means to filter out inauthentic content (pollution) 
for file-sharing applications [8], a method for selecting usable 
network resources [9], a means to identify high-quality contri- 
butions to Wikipedia [lo], and a way to punish [ I  I] or prevent 
[12], [13] free-riders in content dissemination networks. 
The success of a reputation system is measured by how 
accurately the calculated reputations predict the quality of fu- 
ture interactions. This is difficult to achieve in an environment 
where any party can attempt to exploit the system to its own 
benefit. Some attacks have a narrow focus and only affect the 
reputation of the misbehaving identity or a few selected targets. 
Other attacks have a much broader influence, affecting large 
percentages of the identities within the system. Centralized 
or implicitly trusted elements of the reputation system are 
more prone to attack due to their identifiability and key role in 
the functioning of the system. The impact of attacks against 
reputation systems reaches beyond just the manipulation of 
virtual numbers, but turn into dollars fraudulently lost and 
ruined business reputations [14]. 
This paper is the first survey focusing on the characteri- 
zation of reputation systems and threats facing them from a 
computer science perspective. Previous research in the area 
has presented an overview of the design issues of reputation 
systems in peer-to-peer networks [15], surveyed the broader 
issue of trust management [16], and provided an overview of 
the deployed reputation systems [17]. Our work contributes to 
understanding which reputation system design components are 
vulnerable, what are the most appropriate defense mechanisms 
and how these defense mechanisms can be integrated into 
existing or future reputation systems to make them resilient 
to attacks. Specifically: 
1) We propose an analytical framework by which reputa- 
tion systems can be decomposed, analyzed, and com- 
pared using a common set of metrics. This framework 
facilitates insights into the strengths and weaknesses 
of different systems and comparisons within a unified 
framework. 
2) We classify attacks against reputation systems, analyzing 
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HOFFMAN ET AL. 
what system components are exploited by each attack 
category. We elucidate the relevance of these attacks by 
providing specific examples based on real systems. 
3) We characterize existing defense mechanisms for repu- 
tation systems, discussing their applicability to different 
system components and their effectiveness at mitigating 
the identified attacks. 
4) We survey influential reputation systems that have 
shaped this area of research. We analyze each system 
based on our analytical framework, drawing new insights 
into reputation system design. We also discuss each 
system's strengths and weaknesses based on our attack 
classification and defense characterization. 
Roadmap: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
We characterize the fundamental dimensions of reputation 
systems in Section 11. We describe attacks against reputation 
systems components and defense strategies in Sections I11 and 
IV, respectively. We analyze several well-known reputation 
systems in Section V. Finally, we discuss related work in 
Section VI and present concluding remarks in Section VII. 
Due to their common purpose, reputation systems naturally 
share similar structural patterns and ideas. Understanding these 
similarities and developing an analysis framework serves a 
twofold purpose. First, it provides greater insight into prior 
research, facilitating common ground comparison between 
different systems. Second, it provides insights into the fun- 
damental strengths and weaknesses of certain design choices, 
contributing to the future design of attack-resilient reputation 
systems. 
We identify the following three dimensions as being funda- 
mental to any reputation system: 
Formulation. The ideal mathematical underpinnings of 
the reputation metric and the sources of input to that for- 
mulation. For example, a system may accept positive and 
negative feedback information, weighted as +1 and -1 
and define an identity's reputation to be the summation 
of all of its corresponding feedback scores. 
Calculation. The algorithm to calculate the mathematical 
formulation for a given set of constraints (physical distri- 
bution of participants, type of communication substrate, 
etc.). For example, the algorithm to calculate the formu- 
lation could specify that a random set of peers is queried 
and the feedback received for each identity tallied. 
Dissemination. The mechanism that allows system par- 
ticipants to obtain the reputation metrics resultant from 
the calculation. Such a mechanism may involve storing 
the values and disseminating them to the participants. For 
example, a system might choose to use a distributed hash 
table to store the calculated reputation values and a gossip 
protocol to distribute new information. 
Figure 1 presents the general structure of a reputation 
system, including the location of each of the fundamental 
dimensions. The overarching goal of a reputation system is 
to produce a metric encapsulating reputation for each identity 
within the system. Each system receives input from various 
types of sources. Based on this input, a system produces a 
reputation metric through the use of a calculation algorithm. 
Once calculated, reputation metric values are then dissemi- 
nated throughout the system in advance or on demand as the 
metric values are requested. Finally, higher level systems or 
users can then utilize these reputation metric values in their 
decision making processes to penalize or reward identities in 
order to achieve the goals of the user application. 
A. Formulation 
Formulation of a reputation system is the mathematical or 
algorithmic core of the system that precisely determines how 
the available information is transformed into a usable metric. 
It determines the theoretical properties of the system and thus 
the upper bound on its resilience to attacks. As a result, the 
formulation is a critical component since any weakness in the 
design of the formulation allows malicious manipulation of 
the metric values. We identify and discuss three important 
components of the formulation: the source of the information, 
the type of information, and the reputation metric. 
Source of Information: A core component of the formula- 
tion of reputation is the source of the raw information used as 
inputs to the algorithm. The source can either be a manual or 
an automatic source. 
Manual sources are obtained from human feedback, usually 
in the form of user ratings of other identities based on the 
results of a single transaction such as the feedback within 
eBay [3], a specific time period [18], or arbitrary feedback 
[19]. Since these sources are naturally qualitative, the formu- 
lation component must specify some method of converting 
the qualitative metric into a quantitative one. For example, 
a user may feel satisfied with the ultimate outcome of a 
transaction, but be dissatisfied with the timeliness of it. The 
formulation specifies how the user can convert this qualitative 
information into quantitative information, such as by giving 
them the choice of giving a negative, neutral, or positive rating 
[3]. Other proposals include the use of Bayesian procedures 
[9], [20] or fuzzy decision logic [21] to transform the user 
feedback into ratio scaled variables. The formulation may also 
allow the user to tag the quantitative metric with qualitative 
information under the intention of aggregating this information 
with the reputation metric for later human consumption [3]. 
Automatic sources are obtained automatically either via 
direct or indirect observation. Direct, automatic sources of 
information result from data directly observed by an identity, 
such as the success or failure of an interaction, the direct 
observations of cheating, or the measurement of resource 
utilization by neighbors in a peer-to-peer network. Information 
that is obtained second-hand or is inferred from first-hand 
information is classified as an indirect, automatic source. 
Indirect, automatic input sources are relevant in many modem 
reputation systems which are developed to have a notion of 
the transitivity of trust. Nodes share information in order to 
combat the sparsity of first-hand information [22] or to further 
refine the reputation metric [23], [5]. Also, indirect sources of 
information are important in systems such as SuperTrust [24], 
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Fig. 1. Depiction of how a reputation system operates. The large ovals represent the reputation system itself, normally consisting of many different computers 
acting as a distributed system. The rounded box highlights the scope of this paper. 
Information Type: Another component of the formulation 
is whether the source information includes positive (trust 
building) events, negative (trust diminishing) events, or both. 
This design choice fundamentally influences the applications 
for which a given reputation system is most effective as well 
as determines the classes of attacks that are relevant to the 
system. For example, a system that only considers positive 
events will be immune to attacks where malicious identities 
try to falsely degrade others' reputations [23]. While it may 
seem beneficial to only consider one type of information in 
order to limit the possible attacks on the system, this also 
limits the flexibility of the system as well as the ability for 
honest peers to counteract the attacks that are still relevant 
[25]. Continuing the example above, honest participants would 
be unable to give negative feedback regarding those identities 
that are falsely promoting themselves. 
Reputation Metric: The most important component of the 
formulation dimension is the mathematical or algorithmic 
representation of the reputation. The reputation metric can 
be classified as either binary, discrete, or continuous. A 
binary representation of trust converts the qualitative notion 
of reputable versus untrustworthy into a numerical format and 
is utilized by systems like the ones proposed by Xiong and 
Liu [5] and Guha et al. [25]. Some systems, such as Scrivener 
[26] and XRep [27], utilize discrete metrics which have various 
predefined. levels of reputability and allow for a more flexible 
application of the reputation information since different actions 
can correspond to different levels of reputability. Finally, a 
metric can be represented in as a continuous variable, such as 
is done in many of the newer systems [9], [8], [28]. Continuous 
variables are often the easiest representation to compute since 
most formulations result in real number results. 
Certain systems, such as PeerTrust [5] and EigenTrust [29], 
will choose to  convert a continuous metric into a binary metric 
via heuristics or statistical measures, since it is often easier 
for users to base their decisions on a metrics with predefined 
intervals. This is especially true if the continuous metric is not 
a linear representation of reputation [29]. 
Many systems consider the change of reputation over time, 
trying to balance the tradeoff between resiliency to oscillatory 
attacks versus the acceptance of new or previously misbe- 
having identities. While it may seem that greater resiliency 
is more desirable than the easy acceptance of new identities, 
this may hamper overall user satisfaction and system utility as 
well as render systems deployed in less stable environments 
from functioning effectively [30]. For example, if one input to 
the formulation is whether a peer is forwarding data correctly, 
even honest peers may be seen as having a low reputation and 
be denied service due to transient network conditions [12]. 
B. Calculation 
As depicted in Figure 1, the calculation dimension is the 
concrete part of the reputation system that receives input 
information and produces the reputation metric values. While 
the formulation is an idealized method for determining a 
reputation value, the calculation dimension characterizes how 
the formulation is implemented within the constraints of a 
particular reputation system. This dimension strives to be 
accurate to the reputation metric formulation while remaining 
practical to implement and resilient to malicious attack. We 
identify two components relevant to the reputation calcula- 
tion: the calculation structure (centralized or distributed) and 
calculation approach (deterministic or probabilistic). 
Note. At first glance, it may seem that the calculation 
dimension is a direct result of the formulation. However, the 
physical constraints of the system may make the mapping be- 
tween the formulation and calculation dimensions non-trivial. 
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as the centralized computation of the left eigenvector of a 
matrix of trust values, but to calculate this in a scalable 
fashion, the formulation had to be decomposed into an efficient 
distributed algorithm. Another factor causing this mapping 
to be non-trivial is the need to be resilient to malicious 
manipulation of values during the actual calculation. Even 
assuming that all source information is completely accurate, a 
malicious participant can try to manipulate the values during 
the calculation stage. If the system does not account for 
this possibility, reputation values may be manipulated without 
detection. 
Calculation Structure: The reputation system can be struc- 
tured to calculate the reputation metric via a centralized 
authority or across multiple distributed participants. A central- 
ized authority often leads to a simple solution with less po- 
tential for manipulation by malicious outsiders. Many eCom- 
merce businesses such as eBay have successfully deployed 
centralized reputation systems which allow for the long- 
term storage and internal auditing of all reputation data [3]. 
However, a centralized approach relies on the assumption that 
the system participants must completely trust the centralized 
authority which in turn must be correct and always available. 
If the centralized authority is not carefully designed, it can 
become a single point of failure for the entire system [31]. In 
addition, such an approach suffers from the lack of scalability, 
especially if the formulation is complex or the information is 
obtained from a wide range of possibly high latency sources. 
In the open environment of most modern peer-to-peer appli- 
cations, peers do not have centralized authority or repository 
for maintaining or distributing reputation. Instead, most repu- 
tation systems calculate the global scores in a fully distributed 
manner [29], [20], [8], [28]. Although these distributed cal- 
culations are inherently more complex, they scale well [32], 
avoid single points of failure in the system [31], and balance 
load across multiple nodes [23]. Such designs must ensure that 
participants converge upon a usable solution as well as prevent 
malicious manipulation from degrading the performance of the 
entire system. The complexity of data and entity authentication 
in systems lacking a centralized authority and the reliance 
on multiple system participants provides opportunities for 
attackers to subvert the reputation calculation. 
Calculation Approach: Reputation systems implement cal- 
culation by using either deterministic or probabilistic ap- 
proaches. The output of a deterministic calculation can be 
determined solely from knowledge of the input, with very 
precise meaning often attached to this output. Detenninis- 
tic calculations for global reputation values are often only 
practical for centralized calculations, unless the scope of the 
formulation is narrow, identities only incorporate feedback for 
a small subset of peers, or the total size of the system is 
small. Additionally, a deterministic calculation can be used in 
systems where each individual node calculates its own view of 
other nodes' reputation values and there is not a single global 
reputation for each node 1231. 
Probabilistic approaches were proposed to address some 
of the limitations posed by deterministic calculations. Proba- 
bilistic calculations rely on sources of randomness during the 
calculation process, causing their output to be predictable only 
within certain error bounds. 
It is interesting to note that even when formulations are 
deterministic and thus would seem to imply a deterministic 
calculation, the actual calculation may have to be implemented 
probabilistically. For example, the EigenTrust [29] formulation 
represents reputation as the eigenvalues of a matrix (which 
is a deterministic formulation), but the distributed calculation 
is probabilistic in order for the algorithm to scale. Robust 
probabilistic formulations rely on statistical mechanisms, such 
as Markov models [29] and Bayesian models [20], which 
attach error bounds to and give meaning to the probabilistic 
calculation. 
C. Dissemination 
Once reputation has been calculated, it needs to be readily 
accessible to interested parties while remaining resilient to al- 
teration. Calculated values must be efficiently disseminated to 
other recipients or made available upon request. These respon- 
sibilities of a reputation system fall within the dissemination 
dimension. Although calculation and dissemination are often 
intertwined in the implementation, it is useful to separate them 
for analysis purposes. We discuss the following four aspects 
of the dissemination dimension: the dissemination structure, 
dissemination approach, storage strategies, and dissemination 
redundancy. 
Dissemination Structure: Centralized dissemination mech- 
anisms involve a central authority storing and disseminating 
calculated values. The central authority may actually be imple- 
mented via clusters of computers, but this remains classified as 
centralized since the entire structure is controlled exclusively 
by one entity. For example, in order for eBay to scale, it 
must be implemented by high availability clusters. However, 
logically eBay utilizes a centralized authority to disseminate 
the calculated reputation information. In a centralized dissem- 
ination the central authority has greater power to protect the 
integrity of the process, but then also it becomes a single 
point of weakness - if the central authority is fully or partially 
compromised due to external attackers, insiders, or intentional 
misconduct the damage to the reputation system is much 
higher than if the process was distributed. 
In a distributed dissemination, each participant is respon- 
sible for some portion of the calculated reputation values. 
The distribution of responsibility may be symmetrical (e.g. 
distributed hash tables (DHTs) [33], [34], [35], [36]) or asym- 
metrical (e.g. power-law peer-to-peer networks [24], [37]). 
Distributed dissemination is inherently more vulnerable to 
manipulation, and often employs data redundancy, crypto- 
graphic mechanisms, or other measures to preserve metric 
integrity. Distributed mechanisms are also more difficult to 
implement and test properly, and may thus be more vulnerable 
to exploitation [38]. 
Dissemination Approach: The communication pattern of 
dissemination mechanisms can be characterized as either de- 
terministic or probabilistic. Examples of deterministic com- 
munication mechanisms include distribution hierarchies such 
as those in SuperTrust [24] and DHTs such as those em- 
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[5]. Probabilistic communication techniques include epidemic- 
based dissemination techniques such as probabilistic broadcast 
[39], flooding [23], [31] and gossiping [8]. 
Storage Durability: Transient storage is defined to be any 
non-durable, random access memory, whereas permanent stor- 
age is any storage in which data is preserved even during 
periods without power. Depending on the volatility of the 
system components and the computational complexity of the 
calculation, it may be beneficial to store calculated reputation 
values in permanent storage for retrieval later. Systems such 
as PowerTrust [I91 and TrustMe [18] include long-term tem- 
poral information in their formulations and require permanent 
storage in order to be resilient to failures. PowerTrust relies 
on the ability to migrate data in a DHT to preserve historical 
data while TrustMe provides anonymous storage and migration 
protocols. On the other end of the spectrum, systems such as 
ARA [12] calculate reputation values based on a small subset 
of recent transactions, in which case long-term global storage 
is unnecessary. 
Whether or not a system uses permanent storage is more of 
an implementation issue than a core component of a reputation 
system. Permanent storage may be required by the calculation 
mechanisms to detect slow changes in behavior over long 
periods of time. Also, permanent storage must be guarded 
against both malicious manipulation, physical data corruption, 
and data loss [18]. 
Dissemination Redundancy: The degree of redundancy 
built into the dissemination mechanisms is a tradeoff be- 
tween resiliency to manipulation and storage/cornmunication 
efficiency. Redundancy can be employed in many of the 
components of the dissemination dimension, such as having 
redundant messaging in communications patterns or duplicate 
backups of stored values. For example, the TrustMe system 
assumes each copy of the reputation values are stored in sev- 
eral places. Also, most of the modern reputation systems use 
messaging protocols with redundant messages to help ensure 
message delivery and provide some resiliency to malicious 
nodes. Less efficient methods of implementing redundancy 
(e.g. complete duplication of data) are often favored over more 
theoretically desirable methods, such as Reed-Solomon codes 
[40], because these methods are more resilient to Byzantine 
failures and are often easier to implement and prove. Finally, 
systems differ in how they resolve redundancy to produce a 
final reputation metric. Possibilities include but are not limited 
to leaving the redundancy unresolved and presenting the user 
with the raw information, majority voting [29], and using 
weighted averages [28]. 
In this section, we discuss attacks against reputation sys- 
tems. We first state our assumptions about attackers and then 
discuss five separate classes of attack scenarios. We highlight 
both the attacks mechanisms and the system components that 
are exploited during each of the attacks. 
A. Attacker Model 
Several characteristics determine the capability of the at- 
tacker. They include: the location of the attacker in relation to 
the system (insider vs outsider), if the attacker acts alone or 
as part of a coalition of attackers, and whether the attacker is 
active or passive. 
The open nature of reputation systems and their accompany- 
ing peer-to-peer applications leads us to assume all attackers 
are insiders. Insiders are those entities who have legitimate 
access to the system and can participate according to the 
system specifications (i.e. authenticated entities within the 
system), while an outsider is any unauthorized or illegitimate 
entity in the system who may or may not be identifiable. While 
reputation systems often employ some form of authentication 
to prevent unauthorized access, an attacker can obtain multiple 
identities, also known as the Sybil attack [41]. In addition, 
since reputation systems push trust to the fringes of the Internet 
where end-nodes are more likely to be compromised [42], they 
are more vulnerable to insider attacks. 
We assume that attackers are motivated either by selfish 
or malicious intent. Selfish (or rational) attackers manipulate 
reputation values for their own benefit, while malicious attack- 
ers attempt to degrade the reputations of others or impact the 
availability of the reputation system itself. 
In general, attackers can either work alone or in coalitions. 
Although both scenarios are possible and relevant with respect 
to reputation systems, we are primarily concerned with at- 
tacks caused by coalitions of possibly coordinating attackers. 
Coordinated attacks are more difficult to detect and defend 
against because attackers can exhibit multi-faceted behavior 
that allows them to partially hide within their malicious 
coalition. 
We consider all attacks to be active since any form of attack 
on the reputation system requires interaction with the system., 
such as injecting false information, modifying entrusted infor- 
mation, refusing to forward information, deviating from the 
algorithmic processes, or actively attempting to subvert the 
availability of the system. 
B. Attack Classification 
We classify attacks against reputation systems based on the 
goals of the reputation systems targeted by attacks. The goal 
of a reputation system is to ensure that the reputation metrics 
correctly reflect the actions taken by participants in the system 
and cannot be maliciously manipulated. This is not achieved 
if participants can falsely improve their own reputation or 
degrade the reputations of others. As a result of the attacks, 
misbehaving participants can obtain unwarranted service or 
honest participants can be prevented from obtaining service. 
Besides targeting the accuracy of the reputation system, ma- 
licious participants can target the availability of the system 
itself. 
We identify several classes of attacks: 
Self-promoting - Attackers manipulate their own reputa- 
tion by falsely increasing it. 
Self-Serving or Whitewashing - Attackers escape the 
consequence of abusing the system by using some system 
vulnerability to repair their reputation. Once they restore 
their reputation, the attackers can continue the malicious 
behavior. 
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Slandering - Attackers manipulate the reputation of other 
nodes by reporting false data to lower their reputation. 
Orchestrated - Attackers orchestrate their efforts and 
employ several of the above strategies. 
Denial of Service - Attackers may cause denial of service 
by either lowering the reputation of victim nodes so they 
cannot use the system or by preventing the calculation 
and dissemination of reputation values. 
Below, we discuss in detail the attack mechanisms, identifying 
the reputation system components that are exploited during the 
attack. 
1) Self-promoting: In self-promoting attacks, attackers seek 
to falsely augment their own reputation. Such attacks are 
only possible in systems that consider positive feedback in 
the formulation. Fundamentally, this is an attack against the 
formulation, but attackers may also exploit weaknesses in the 
calculation or dissemination dimensions to falsely increase 
reputation metric values. 
Self-promotion attacks can be performed by attacker alone 
or organized in groups of collaborating identities. One very 
basic form of the attack occurs when an attacker fabricates fake 
positive feedback about itself or modifies its own reputation 
during the dissemination. Systems that lack data authentication 
and integrity are vulnerable to such attacks as they are not able 
to discern between fabricated and legitimate feedbacks. 
However, even if source data is authenticated, self- 
promotion attacks are possible if disparate identities or a single 
physical identity acquiring multiple identities through a Sybil 
attack [41] collude to promote each other. Systems that do 
not require participants to provide proof of interactions which 
result in positive reputations are particularly vulnerable to this 
attack. To perform the attack, colluding identities mutually 
participate in events that generate real feedback, resulting 
in high volumes of positive feedback for the colluding par- 
ticipants. Because the colluders are synthesizing events that 
produce verifiable feedback at a collective rate faster than the 
average, they are able to improve their reputations faster than 
honest participants or counter the effects of possible negative 
feedback. Such patterns of attack have been observed in the 
Maze file sharing system [43]. Attackers that are also interact- 
ing with other identities in honest ways are known as moles 
[32]. Colluding attackers can also contribute further to the 
self-promotion of each other by manipulating the computation 
dimension when aggregating reputation values. 
Mitigating self-promoting attacks requires reputation sys- 
tems to provide accountability, proof of successful transac- 
tions, and the ability to limit or prevent an attacker from ob- 
taining multiple identities. The computation dimension should 
also include mechanisms to prevent colluding adversaries to 
subvert the computation and storage of the reputation values. 
Complementarily, the impact of the attacks can be decreased 
by detecting and reacting to groups of colluders that interact 
almost exclusively with each other. However, finding these 
colluders, which can be formulated as finding a clique of a 
certain size within a graph, is known to be NP-complete and 
only heuristics solutions have been proposed so far [44]. 
2) Self-serving: Self-serving attacks, also known as white- 
washing [45], occur when attackers abuse the system for short- 
term gains by letting their reputation degrade and then re- 
entering the system with a new identity and a fresh repu- 
tation. The attack is facilitated by the availability of cheap 
pseudonyms and the fact that reciprocity is much harder to 
maintain with easily changed identifiers [46]. 
This attack fundamentally targets the reputation system's 
formulation. Formulations that are based exclusively on nega- 
tive feedback are especially vulnerable to this type of behavior 
since newcomers have equal reputation metric values as partic- 
ipants which showed long term good behavior. The system is 
also vulnerable if the reputation formulation relies exclusively 
on long-term history without discriminating between old and 
recent actions. In systems with formulations that include 
positive feedback, attackers may have to behave honestly for 
an initial period of time to build up a positive reputation 
before starting the self-serving attack. Attackers that follow 
this pattern are also known as traitors [15]. 
Self-serving attacks may be combined with other types 
of attacks to make them more effective. For example, in 
systems with both positive and negative feedback, concurrently 
executing a self-promoting attack will lengthen the duration of 
effectiveness of a self-serving attack. Likewise, self-serving 
identities may slander those identities that give negative feed- 
back about the attacker so that their negative feedback will 
appear less reputable since many systems weight the opinions 
of an identity by its current level of trustworthiness. 
Preventing self-serving attacks requires reputation systems 
to use a formulation that does not result in the same reputation 
for both newcomers and participants that have showed good 
behavior for a long time, taking into account short history 
and limiting the users from switching identities or obtaining 
multiple identities. 
3) Slandering: In slandering attacks, one or more identities 
falsely produce negative feedback about other identities. As 
with self-promoting attacks, systems that do not authenti- 
cate the origin of the feedback are extremely vulnerable to 
slanderous information. In general, these attacks target the 
formulation dimension of a reputation system. 
The attack can be conducted both by a single attacker and 
a coalition of attackers. As typically the effect of a single 
slandering node is small, especially if the system limits the rate 
at which valid negative feedback can be produced, slandering 
attacks primarily involve collusion between several identities. 
Depending on the application of the system, slandering attacks 
may be more or less severe than self-promotion attacks. For 
example, in high-value monetary systems, the presence of even 
small amounts of negative feedback may severely harm an 
identity's reputation and ability to conduct business [7]. 
The lack of authentication and high sensitivity of the 
formulation to negative feedback are the main factors that 
facilitate slandering attacks. Reputation systems must consider 
the inherent trade-offs in the sensitivity of the formulation 
to negative feedback. If the sensitivity is lower, then the 
formulation is robust against malicious collectives falsely 
slandering a single entity, but it allows entities to exhibit bad 
behavior for a longer time, for the same decrease in reputation. 
On the other hand, if sensitivity is higher, the bad behavior of 
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are more susceptible to attacks from malicious collectives. 
If malicious collectives are well-behaved except to slander a 
single identity it may be difficult to distinguish that slander 
from the scenario where the single identity actually deserved 
the bad feedback that was received. 
Defense techniques to prevent false feedback include em- 
ploying stricter feedback authentication mechanisms, validat- 
ing input to make sure that feedback is actually tied to some 
transaction, and incorporating methods to limit the number of 
identities malicious nodes can assume. 
Systems may also limit the impact of slandering attacks by 
using formulations that compute reputations based exclusively 
on direct information. However, this is not possible in reputa- 
tion systems with sparse interaction, where trust inference is 
needed [22]. In such systems, the trust inference mechanisms 
must be robust to malicious attacks. 
4) Orchestrated: Unlike the previously described attacks 
that employ primarily one strategy, in orchestrated attacks, 
colluders follow a multifaced, coordinated attack. These at- 
tacks utilize multiple strategies, where attackers employ dif- 
ferent attack vectors, change their behavior over time, and 
divide up identities to target. While orchestrated attacks fun- 
damentally target a system's formulation, these attacks also 
may target the calculation and dissemination dimensions. If the 
colluding attackers become a significant part of the calculation 
or dissemination of reputation within an area of the system, 
they can potentially alter reputation metric values to their 
benefit. 
One example of an orchestrated attack, known as an oscil- 
lation attack [47], is where colluders divide themselves into 
teams and each team plays a different role at different times. 
At one point in time, some teams will exhibit honest behavior 
while the other teams exhibit dishonest behavior. The honest 
teams serve to build their own reputations as well as decrease 
the speed of decline of the reputation of the dishonest teams. 
The dishonest teams attempt to gain the benefits of dishonest 
behavior for as long as possible, until their reputation is too 
low to obtain benefit from the system. At this point, the roles 
of the teams switch, so that the dishonest teams can rebuild 
their reputation and the previously honest teams can begin 
exhibiting dishonest behavior. Even more complex scenarios 
are possible where there are more than two roles. For example 
one team of nodes may self-promote, another may slander 
benign nodes, and the final team misbehaves in the context of 
the peer-to-peer system. 
Orchestrated attacks are most effective when there are 
several colluders for each role. Larger numbers allow each 
colluder to be linked less tightly to other colluders, which 
makes detection much more difficult. Colluders performing 
orchestrated attacks balance between maximizing selfish or 
malicious behavior and avoiding detection. Robust formula- 
tions increase the number of colluders that must participate in 
order to achieve the desired effect. 
Identifying orchestrated attacks is difficult since instead of 
trying to identify cliques in a graph representing identities and 
their relationships, systems need to identify partially connected 
clusters where each colluder may not appear to be connected 
to every other colluder due to the differing behaviors of the 
different roles in the orchestrated strategy. Within a window 
of time, it is possible that two colluders have no direct inter- 
action observable by the system and thus appear completely 
separated, while they are actually colluding indirectly. For 
example, the two colluders may produce negative feedback 
against identities that gave negative feedback against another, 
different colluder. Due to the nature of reputation systems, 
perfect defense against orchestrated attacks appears to be an 
open problem. 
5) Denial of Service: Finally, attackers may seek to sub- 
vert the mechanisms underlying the reputation system itself, 
causing a denial of service. Such attacks are conducted by ma- 
licious nonrational attackers, making them difficult to defend 
against. Systems using centralized approaches and lacking any 
type of redundancy are typically vulnerable to denial of service 
attacks. Attackers can attempt to cause the central entity 
to become overloaded (e.g. by overloading its network or 
computational resources). These attacks target the calculation 
and dissemination dimensions of a system and are performed 
by groups of colluding attackers. 
Preventing a reputation system from operating properly with 
a denial of service attack may be as attractive to attackers as 
corrupting the reputation values, especially if the application 
employing the reputation system is automated and needs to 
make decisions in a timely fashion. For example, consider 
a peer-to-peer data dissemination application where data is 
routed along the most trustworthy paths. If the reputation 
system is inoperable, the system relying on reputation may 
need to continue to route data notwithstanding, allowing ma- 
licious identities to participate for periods of time without their 
negative reputations being known (or without being punished 
for their negative behavior). 
Distributed calculation and dissemination algorithms are 
often less vulnerable to attacks if enough redundancy is em- 
ployed such that misbehavior or loss of a few participants will 
not affect the operation of the system as a whole. However, 
some distributed storage components such as DHTs may have 
their own vulnerabilities [38] and they can be in turn exploited 
by an attacker to create denial of service against the reputation 
system. 
IV. DEFENSE STRATEGIES 
In this section, we survey the defense mechanisms employed 
by existing reputation systems. Although none of the existing 
systems provide defenses against all the attacks presented in 
Section 111, many of them use techniques to address attacks 
conducted by selfish rational attackers and a limited number of 
attacks conducted by coalitions of malicious attackers. These 
techniques can be grouped around several major design char- 
acteristics that facilitate the attacks. We discuss mechanisms 
to defend against attackers acquiring multiple identities in 
Section IV-A. We discuss techniques to ensure that direct 
observations reflect reality in Section IV-B and techniques to 
defend against generation and propagation of false rumors in 
Section IV-C. The major reason behind self-serving attacks 
is the fact that systems do not distinguish newcomers from 
participants that have demonstrated good behavior over time. 
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We discuss techniques to address this issue in Section IV-D. 
Finally, we review techniques used by reputation systems to 
address more general denial of service attacks in Section IV-E. 
A. Preventing Multiple Identities (Sybil Attacks) 
The problem of obtaining multiple identities received signif- 
icant attention in recent years as it impacts not only reputation 
systems but peer-to-peer systems in general. Any strategy 
based on reciprocity (either direct or indirect) in an online 
computational environment must deal with the problem of 
cheap or anonymous pseudonyms [46], which often allow 
malicious identities to escape the consequences of their behav- 
ior. Proposed solutions fall into centralized and decentralized 
approaches. 
In a centralized approach, a central authority issues and 
verifies credentials unique to each entity. To increase the 
cost of obtaining multiple identities, the central authority may 
require monetary or computational payment for each identity. 
Although this may limit the number of identities an attacker 
can obtain, there are scenarios in which it may not be possible 
or practical to have a centralized authority. Additionally, the 
central authority represents a single point of failure for the 
system and can itself be subjected to attacks. 
Decentralized approaches do not rely on a central entity 
to issue certificates for identities. Some solutions proposed 
include binding an "unique" identifier such as IP addresses to 
public keys [41] or using network coordinates to detect nodes 
with multiple identities [48]. However, IP addresses can be 
spoofed and network coordinates can be manipulated by at- 
tackers [49]. More recently, social networks were proposed to 
detect attackers posing under multiple identities. The approach 
in [50] creates a graph in which nodes represent identities 
and edges represent trust-relations. The protocol ensures that 
the number of edges connecting the honest regions and the 
attacker regions is very small. Thus, the impact of attackers 
with multiple identities is decreased and the attackers may 
eventually be isolated. 
B. Mitigating Generation of False Rumors 
First hand or direct feedback is created as a result of 
direct interaction. To prevent the generation of false rumors 
by fabrication or modification, several systems propose to 
integrate accountability by means of digital signatures and 
irrefutable proofs. Irrefutable proofs, often implemented using 
cryptographic mechanisms, is a defense strategy intended to 
mitigate the fabrication of feedback by requiring all feedback 
to be associated with proof of a valid transaction (the in- 
teraction of two identities) within the system. For example, 
TrustGuard [47] uses a digitally signed identifier from the 
other party as a proof of a transaction and describes a protocol 
to ensure that these transaction proofs are exchanged in 
an efficient, atomic manner. The approach provides defense 
against selfish attackers, but it is inefficient against coalitions 
of malicious attackers. Additional mechanisms are needed to 
detect that colluding adversaries rate each other high to build 
good reputation in the system. 
For small coalitions, false data can be filtered out by using 
a dishonest feedback filter, using similarity measure to rate 
the credibility of reported feedback. If the feedback data is 
similar to first-hand experience and other received feedback, 
it will be used in the reputation calculation. This approach is 
used by TrustGuard [47]. 
C. Mitigating Spreading of False Rumors 
Reputation formulation is usually based on direct and indi- 
rect information. Basing reputation calculation only on direct 
information may limit the impact of malicious coalitions on 
reputation values and it was proposed in systems like Scrivener 
[26]. The drawback is that in many systems it cannot be 
guaranteed that every pair of participants will interact and 
that the interaction is symmetric [22]. Thus, there is a need to 
share the direct information and aggregate the locally observed 
information. 
Several mechanisms that were especially designed to cope 
with the problem of spreading and aggregating false rep- 
utations were proposed. One approach is to rely on pre- 
trusted identities to reduce the effectiveness of fabricated 
or altered information. Some systems, such as EigenTrust, 
depend on pre-trusted identities to ensure that the probabilistic 
trust algorithm will converge. Pre-trusted identities do pose 
additional risk, because if they are compromised, significant 
damage can be inflicted before the compromised node is 
identified. To reduce this risk, systems can employ integrity 
checking mechanisms (manual audits), checks and balances 
on the pre-trusted identities (predicates on expected behavior 
of these identities), and allowing pre-trusted identities not to 
be trusted absolutely (as in EigenTrust). 
Another approach is to employ statistical methods to build 
robust formulations that can be reasoned about in a pre- 
cise fashion. For example, in [20] a Bayesian framework is 
employed, where the probability of a node misbehaving is 
modeled according to a Beta distribution with the parameters 
of the distribution being updated as feedback is received. Be- 
cause the formulation is based on statistics, a precise meaning 
can be attached to the output. In this case, it allows the 
users to specify an intuitive tolerance for bad behavior, with 
tolerance being precisely defined as the maximum percentage 
of instances that a node has misbehaved before it is excluded 
from interaction. 
Concepts derived from feedback control-theory were used in 
P2PRep [9] to adjust the weighting of historical information in 
the calculation of the local reputation value. This adaptability 
gives the system greater resiliency to oscillatory behavior 
because the weighting of the historical information is tied to 
how well the reputation is predicting the future. TrustGuard 
[47] defines a heuristic to mitigate dishonest feedback based 
on the insight that untrustworthy nodes are more likely to lie 
and conversely trustworthy nodes are more likely to be honest. 
D. Preventing Short-tern Abuse of the System 
Several systems recognized the problem of attackers abusing 
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10 HOFFMAN ET AL. 
degrade quickly and then re-entering the system with a new A. CORE 
identity. 
To differentiate newcomers from nodes already existing 
in the system which demonstrated good behavior, several 
systems propose that newcomers must gain trust and that their 
reputation increases gradually [23], [12]. The approach ensures 
that newcomers will not start with a high reputation and forces 
them to behave correctly for a given amount of time . Another 
approach forces new nodes to initially "pay their dues" and 
provide more service than they receive in order to build a 
positive reputation [26]. One of the challenges many systems 
face is balancing the ease of admittance of new nodes versus 
the resilience to attacks [30]. 
Other systems such as P2PRep [9] and TrustGuard [47] also 
observed that treating old positive behavior equally to new 
negative behavior may result in attackers abusing the system 
by using previous altruism to hide current malicious behavior. 
They propose to use more aggressive short-term history and 
to give more weight to recent negative behavior. The approach 
facilitates quick detection when a node becomes a traitor. The 
drawback is that in systems that do not offer any protection 
against generating and spreading false rumors, this technique 
allows malicious node to prevent honest nodes from using the 
system. 
E. Mitigating Denial of Service Attacks 
Mechanisms to prevent denial of service against the dissem- 
ination depend on the structure used for storage and transport. 
For example, some systems such as TrustMe [18] use random- 
ization techniques to mitigate the power of malicious collec- 
tives. If participants are randomly selected for calculation and 
dissemination, then its less likely that a malicious collective 
can control a significant portion of the redundant elements 
in a process. The system may choose to randomly divide 
responsibility for either entire identities (with some identities 
becoming permanently responsible for other identities), or the 
identities could be randomly assigned for each instance of the 
calculation. 
When systems like DHTs are used, more security mech- 
anisms [51] and data replication mechanisms [52] must be 
employed to ensure that requests are successfully performed. 
Techniques to cope with denial of service attacks on dis- 
semination are similar with the ones used by many routing 
protocols and include: use of acknowledgements, multi-path 
dissemination, gossip mechanisms and forward error correc- 
tion codes. 
In this section, we use our framework to analyze in chrono- 
logical order several existing reputation systems. We provide 
insights into the vulnerabilities of each system and discuss the 
effectiveness of defense mechanisms they employ. Due to lack 
of space we discuss six representative systems in detail and 
summarize the other systems in Figures 3 and 4. 
The CORE [53] system was motivated by the need to 
prevent malicious and selfish behavior of nodes in mobile ad 
hoc networks (MANETS). 
Formulation: The final reputation metric combines directly . 
observable behavior with shared, indirect observations for 
each known system operation (such as packet forwarding or 
routing). For each direct interaction between system nodes, 
each operation is rated over the range from [- 1,1], with higher 
ratings meaning the operation met the expected result. The 
interactions are recorded and over time they are combined 
using a weighted average, giving higher preference to older 
data. The reason more relevance is given to past observations is 
that a sporadic misbehavior in recent observations should have 
a minimal influence on the evaluation of the final reputation 
value. The weights are normalized such that the average is 
also defined over the range [-I, 11. Indirect observations are 
collected from reply messages sent by distant peers in response 
to some actual communication related to the purpose of the 
underlying system. Direct and indirect observations relating to 
each system operation are linearly combined, and then these 
sub-totals for each operation are combined using a weighted 
average. The weights for each function are chosen based 
on simulation results that indicate which functions are more 
important to the proper operation of the network. 
Calculation: Calculation proceeds deterministically in a 
straightforward fashion, as all information is either generated 
at the calculating identity (direct observations) or is contained 
in a reply that the identity has received over the course of 
normal system operations. The efficiency of calculating the 
direct reputation sub-totals requires a weighted average of 
all previously known historical values, giving an efficiency 
of O(t ) ,  where t  is the number of values retained. The total 
reputation is obtain by including also indirect observations, 
giving a final efficiency of O(c r t )  = O(t ) ,  where c  is a 
constant. 
Dissemination: Indirect observations are not actively dis- 
seminated between identities in order to conserve power and 
decrease the number of messages sent by nodes in the network. 
Rather, indirect observations are embedded within replies 
already defined within the system protocol. For example, each 
node on a routing path may append indirect observations about 
the positive behavior of its neighbor nodes. 
Defense Mechanisms: Of the defense mechanisms outlined 
in this paper, CORE uses heuristics motivated by simula- 
tion results to prevent attacks against the reputation metric. 
Since the paper is primarily concerned with motivating selfish 
nodes to participate in the wireless protocols, the defense 
techniques only partially address malicious behavior. In the 
CORE system, there are no techniques to preserve the integrity 
of the data prorogated through the network. While indirect 
observations are limited to positive observations to prevent 
self-serving and slandering attacks, this does not prevent self- 
promoting attacks. The ability of a node to self-promote in 
turn degrades the service received by benign node since they 
will have lower reputation scores than the malicious nodes and 
be viewed as less cooperative. 
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The EigenTrust [29] reputation system was motivated by the 
need to filter out inauthentic content in peer-to-peer file sharing 
networks. EigenTrust calculates a global reputation value for 
each peer in the system based on the local opinions of all of the 
other peers. The local opinions of nodes are aggregated into 
a matrix format and the global reputation values are obtained 
by calculating the left principal eigenvector of that matrix. 
Formulation: The input to the EigenTrust formulation con- 
sists of  the information derived from the direct experience 
a peer has with other peers in the network and indirect 
information about the perception of neighboring peers about 
each other. To acquire the direct information, users provide 
manual feedback about each peer-to-peer transaction. A user 
rates each transaction using the binary scale of positive or 
negative and the summation of these ratings is used as input 
into the formulation. The indirect information is automatically 
exchanged between peers and is what gives the system the 
ability to develop transitive trust. The system considers both 
positive and negative information and is biased towards posi- 
tive information. 
The formulation does not take into consideration the effects 
of how reputations change over time. While it is true that the 
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- Partial 
Fig. 4. The weaknesses of existing systems to known attack strategies and the defense mechanisms that these systems employ 
local trust values are a summation of all votes ever cast for a this bound can be reduced to O(1og n)  without compromising 
particular identity, the formulation itself makes no attempt to accuracy [29]. 
distinguish between votes cast today vs. votes cast a year ago. Dissemination: EigenTrust uses a deterministic distributed 
The final reputation metric is formulated as follows: ~~~h dissemination framework relying on DHTs for reputation value 
identity, i, calculates a reputation metric for another identity, k and lookup. A the "Ore is respOn- 
by asking the other identities, j, for their opinions of identity sible for calculating, storing, and communicating reputation 
k and weighting those opinions by i's opinion of j :  tik = values for all identities whose hashed identity falls within 
-yj cijcjk.  l-hiS can be formulated as matrix multiplication: the score manager's ownership range in the DHT. The use of 
define C to be the matrix [cij],  define 6 to be 'dktik, and define multiple hash functions allows multiple score managers to be 
c: to be 'dkcik. Then 6 = (CT)6 .  To broaden the view further, assigned to each host. The use of multiple score managers and 
an identity may ask for his neighbor's neighbor's opinion: replication within the DHT provide redundancy at all stages 
((CT)(CT)), which is then weighted by the identity's opinion of the storage and dissemination process. The efficiency of 
of his neighbors (6). Increasing n in 6 = ( c ~ ) ~ s  continues dissemination corresponds to the efficiency of the underlying 
to broaden the view, and given certain assumptions, ti, will DHT in performing lookups, which is typically O(1ogn). Attacks and Defense Mechanisms: The EigenTrust formu- 
converge to the same vector (the left principal eigenvector of lation has foundations in statistics, as the global trust vector C) for all 6 .  As all nodes will converge to the same values, 
these values represent the global trust vector. can be formulated as the stationary distribution of a Markov 
chain. The formulation is designed so nodes give greater 
The reputation metric is formulated deterministically and weight to information obtained from their neighbors or nodes 
produces values on a continuous spectrum between 0.0 and they have interacted with in the past to mitigate malicious 
1.0. manipulations. Pre-trusted identities are used to bias ratings 
Calculation: While the formulation lends itself naturally to towards known good nodes and ensure that the probabilistic 
a centralized calculation based upon matrix operations, this calculation will converge quickly. Redundancy is employed 
is not desirable in the peer-to-peer file sharing environment. during the calculation and dissemination stages to prevent 
Instead, each peer calculates the global trust values by using a benign data loss and malicious data tampering. Each of the 
probabilistic algorithm which guarantees that each participant score managers for an identity is randomly selected, making it 
will converge to the same value within some error bounds. less likely that a single malicious collective will be responsible 
For the original distributed algorithm, the cost to calculate for the reputation value for any one identity. 
the global trust value for one identity is O(n) in the worst 
case since (a) the number of iterations needed to converge C. Scrivener 
can be viewed as constant and (b) it will need to potentially Scrivener [26] is based on principles from economics which 
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in order to cooperate and not cheat the system. The goal of 
Scrivener is to enforce fairness among all participants in a 
peer-to-peer file sharing system. The reputation of each host 
is not a globally calculated value, but rather is specific to 
individual pairwise sharing relationships within the overlay 
network. The formulation and calculation dimensions describe 
how pairwise relationships determine credit balances. The dis- 
semination dimension describes how a transitive relationship 
can be formed between non-neighboring identities. 
1) Formulation: Scrivener maintains a history of interac- 
tions between neighboring peers, tracking when they provide 
resources (credits) and when they consume resources (debits). 
The system collects directly observable information automat- 
ically for each interaction of immediate neighbors in the 
overlay network. Credit balance is defined to be the difference 
in the amount of data consumed less the resources provided. 
In order to establish long-term cooperation, nodes must keep 
this credit balance in stable storage. Using the credit limit in 
conjunction with confidence metric that represents how often 
a request is successfully fulfilled by a given node, a credit 
limit for each node is established. 
In order to allow nodes to join the network, each new 
neighbor chosen by a node is initially given a small, posi- 
tive credit limit. To prevent nodes from constantly selecting 
new neighbors and abusing the initial credit limit, any node 
requesting (not chosen) to be a neighbor of a node is assigned 
an initial credit limit of zero. When a host A has used up its 
credit limit with a host B ,  B will not further fulfill requests 
from A. Host B can still request data from A so that A can 
repay the debt. If A does not fulfill B's requests properly 
then B's confidence in A decreases. If the confidence reaches 
zero, B will ignore A and choose a different identity in the 
overlay network to replace A as its neighbor. Since the credit 
is assumed to be maintained in stable storage, B remembers 
the debt that was associated with A indefinitely. 
Although the credit balance is a summary of all past 
behavior of a neighboring node, no record is kept of how this 
has changed over time. The formulation itself is deterministic 
and produces discrete values. 
Calculation: The calculation of the credits and confidence 
metric are fully distributed to the point that there is no single, 
global value produced for each identity in the system. Each 
calculation is processed entirely local to the pair of identities 
involved and can be performed in constant running time with 
respect to the number of identities in the system. 
Dissemination: As credit balances are only established 
between neighboring identities in the overlay network, a 
transitive trading system is needed to facilitate data transfers 
between any two arbitrary identities within the overlay net- 
work. 
If host A wants to receive content from some host, Z, 
it first must find a credit path, where each identity in the 
credit path has the ability to positive credit with which to 
"pay" the successor identity. This path is normally determined 
using the overlay network routing protocol, such as through 
the use of a DHT. Once the path has been determined, A 
then simultaneously sends a payment to and decreases its 
confidence in the first identity in the credit path (named B 
herein). The drop in confidence is in anticipation of B's 
possible failure to route the request to the next identity in 
the credit path and to motivate B to participate in the request. 
If B does not participate, A's confidence in B will eventually 
reach zero and A will refuse to communicate with B .  Then, 
B uses the credit received from A to continue the process 
until the destination is reached. Once Z receives the credit, 
Z will process the request. Once the request is complete, Z 
sends an indicator message backwards along the credit path, 
which causes nodes to adjust confidence levels back to their 
original values and then increase them to reflect the success 
of the content transfer. 
Redundancy is integrated into the system via the notion of 
content caching. The efficiency of this process is determined 
by the efficiency of (a) finding the credit path (b) the length 
of the resulting credit path. 
Defense Mechanisms: Similar to CORE, Scrivener is pri- 
marily concerned with motivating rational, selfish nodes to 
participate in the system and thus the defense techniques 
only partially address malicious behavior. The primary defense 
mechanism within Scrivener is the use of statistical formulas to 
encourage participants to participate correctly in the protocol. 
If nodes act selfishly or maliciously, they will eventually 
acquire a negative credit balance and with the assumed long- 
lived identifers, eventually be excluded from the network. 
Redundancy is also utilized and allows identities to check the 
validity of certain claims by an identity. For example, if a 
sender, Z, claims that some content does not exist or that it 
has completed the transaction, nodes along the credit path (that 
later propagate the finished message) can choose to ask other 
identities providing the same content to verify the truth of the 
claim. 
D. TrustGuard 
While electronic reputation systems have been proposed as 
an efficient and effective way to minimize the effect of selfish 
and malicious nodes on peer-to-peer systems, little work has 
focus on the vulnerabilities of the reputation system itself. 
The TrustGuard framework [47] has been proposed as a way 
to safeguard reputation systems. The system uses a strategic 
oscillation guard based on a Proportional-Integral-Derivative 
(PID) controller used in control systems to combat malicious 
oscillatory behavior. Fake feedbacks are prevented with the 
help of a fake transaction detection component which binds 
feedback to unforgeable transaction proofs. Finally, dishonest 
feedbacks are filtered out by using a similarity measure to rate 
the credibility of reported feedback. The framework focuses on 
designing a robust formulation while maintaining flexibility in 
the system implementation, allowing the mitigation techniques 
to be integrated into a variety of reputation systems. 
Formulation: Once the node has collected data and the data 
has passed through the fake transaction detection component 
and the dishonest feedback filter, it is fed into the strategic 
oscillation guard in order to create a final trust value. The 
strategic oscillation guard takes as input the raw reputation 
values computed from some other reputation system and 


















14 HOFFMAN ET AL. 
The first component represents a node's current perfor- 
mance and is the raw trust value as computed by the 
underlying reputation system. 
The second component is the past history of a nodes 
actions formulated as the integral of the function repre- 
senting all prior reputation values divided by the current 
point in time. 
The third and final component reflects sudden changes in 
a node's performance and is formulated by the derivative 
of the above mentioned function. 
The flexibility and resiliency to attack are achieved in how the 
weights for each component are chosen. For example, if the 
second component is weighted heavily, the past performance 
of the node is more important than the current performance. 
Calculation: In order to efficiently store and calculate the 
historical components specified by the strategic oscillation 
guard's formulation, the concept of fading memories is intro- 
duced. Instead of storing all previous reputation values, Trust- 
Guard represents these values using only log, t  values, with 
exponentially more detail stored about the recent events. This 
technique allows the strategic oscillation guard calculations to 
be deterministically performed with an efficiency of O(1og t )  
instead of 0 (t).  
Dissemination: The dissemination of information is depen- 
dent on the underlying overlay network and thus the dissemi- 
nation techniques are outside the scope of the TrustGuard. 
Defense Mechanisms: In TrustGuard, it is assumed that 
the base overlay network is resilient to attack and provides a 
means for authenticating messages. Under these assumptions, 
TrustGuard uses control theory as the basis for its strate- 
gic oscillation guard. Using different empirically determined 
weighting for the guard, the system can mitigate many of the 
malicious attacks. 
The fake transaction detection mechanism uses irrefutable 
proofs to prevent input resulting from fake transactions from 
being admitted into the reputation system. Assuming each 
entity in the network has an associated publiclprivate key pair, 
a transaction proof is exchange for each transaction, allowing 
claims of malicious activity to be checked by a trusted third 
Party. 
The goal of the dishonest feedback filter is to use statistical 
measures to make the raw reputation values computed by 
the underlying reputation system resilient against identities 
that report false feedback. The first approach mentioned is to 
weight the source values used to compute the reputation value 
for a node by the current reputation values of the identities 
producing the source information. However, this has the draw- 
back of being vulnerable to nodes which follow the protocol 
and have good reputations but lie about others reputation. 
Instead, the authors propose to weight reputation values by 
using a personality similarity measure, which is defined to be 
the normalized root mean square of the differences between 
the feedback each node gave to identities in the common 
identity set. The common identity set is defined to be those 
identities that both identities have interacted with in the past. 
This has the effect that the weight given to others' feedback 
about oneself will depend on the similarity of how both rated 
other identities in the past, with the idea that honest identities 
will approximately give the same feedback for other identities. 
The Credence [8] system is also built around this idea. 
The P2PRep [9] reputation system is designed to mitigate 
the effects of selfish and malicious peers in an anonymous, 
completely decentralized system. The system uses fuzzy tech- 
niques to collect and aggregate user opinions into distinct 
values of trust and reputation. In P2PRep, trust is a defined 
as a function based on an entity's reputation and several 
environmental factors such as the time since the reputation 
has last been modified. Reputation is viewed at two levels 
in the system: locally representing the direct interactions 
between peers and network-wide representing the aggregation 
of multiple opinions about a peer. When a peer wants to use 
a network resource (download a file), it (1) queries for the 
resource locations and receives back a list of possible resource 
providers, (2) polls the network about the reputation of the 
possible resource providers, (3) evaluates the poll responses, 
and (4) synthesizes a reputation value from the local and 
network responses using fuzzy techniques. Based on this 
synthesized value, a peer will decide whether or not to trust 
the provider and use the resource. 
Formulation: In P2PRep, since identities are assumed to be 
anonymous and no peer will retain an identity with a negative 
reputation, only positive values are used in the formulation. 
Each direct interaction between system nodes is recorded and 
given a Boolean value, with 1 indicating the outcome was 
satisfactory and 0 otherwise. In order to calculate a local 
reputation value, the individual Boolean values are aggregated 
using a fuzzy operation which takes into account the age 
and importance of the data, resulting in a value over the 
range from [O, 11. In order to augment the local reputation 
value, a peer will collect reputation values from the network. 
Using an Ordered Weighted Average, the indirect observations 
obtained from the network query are combined with the local 
observations to produce a final reputation value in the unit 
interval of [ O , l ] .  
I) Calculation: The calculation of both the local and net- 
work reputations are fully distributed to the point that there 
is no single, global value produced for each identity in the 
system. For each possible interaction, data is gathered from 
the network and processed locally by the node requesting 
the resource and each calculation can be performed in linear 
running time with respect to the number of identities that reply 
to a poll request for reputation values. 
2) Dissemination: All information requests are broadcast 
throughout the network and all information replies are unicast 
back to the requestor using the underlying peer-to-peer sys- 
tem's communication framework. Several improvements can 
be made to improve the efficiency of the dissemination struc- 
ture including intelligent forwarding techniques to forward poll 
packets only to the necessary peers and vote caching. 
3) Defense Mechanisms: The main defense technique 
P2PRep utilizes to mitigate the effect of malicious nodes is 
a vote verification process. The requestor randomly audits 
some of the votes by sending a vote confirmation message 
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to the IP address associated with the vote. This ensures the 
interaction actually happened and the vote corresponding to 
that IP address is correct, making vote falsification more 
difficult for an attacker. Also, the formulation of the network 
wide reputation is designed to give more weights to local 
observations and uses an adaptive weighing scheme in order 
to be responsive to network change, making it more difficult 
for malicious nodes to gain an advantage by reporting false 
votes. 
Another key design consideration in the P2PRep is main- 
taining user anonymity. The system guards the anonymity of 
users and the integrity of packets through the use of public 
key cryptography. All replies are signed using the requestors 
public key, protecting the identity of the responder and the 
integrity of the data. Only the requestor is able to decrypt the 
packet and check the validity of the information. 
E Credence 
Credence [8] was motivated by the need for peers to defend 
against file pollution in peer-to-peer file sharing networks 
and has been deployed as an add-on to the LimeWire client 
for the Gnutella network. The system relies on the intuitive 
notion that honest identities will produce similar votes as they 
rate the authenticity of a file, implying that identities with 
similar voting patterns can be trusted more than identities with 
dissimilar voting patterns. 
Formulation: The input to the formulation are the users' 
manually entered positive or negative votes indicating the 
authenticity of a downloaded file. Specifically, each user is 
asked to indicate for each attribute of the search result whether 
the attribute was one of many possible true values, was the 
only possible true value, or was not a true value (possibly 
specifying what the true value actually should be). A historical 
record of an identity's recent votes are stored in a local vote 
database. Additionally, each identity will proactively query the 
peer-to-peer network to gather additional votes for neighboring 
nodes. 
The final reputation metric for a search result is formulated 
by taking a weighted average of other identities' statements 
(each statement represents +1 if the statement completely 
supports the search result's atuibutes or -1 otherwise). The 
weight assigned to each identity depends on the statistical 
correlation between the vote history of the identity performing 
the calculation and the vote history for each of its peers. 
Heuristics are applied to the correlation coefficient so that 
statistically insignificant correlations and correlations without 
sufficient history are discarded and that new identities without 
a large voting history can still estimate a weight. 
1 )  Calculation: The calculation of reputation metric values 
for a given search query result proceeds as follows: First, an 
identity will send vote gathering queries into the network, 
requesting that neighboring identities respond with their vote 
for the file of interest as well as with the most important 
votes that the neighboring identities know about. Using the 
local vote information and the received votes weighted with 
their measured correlation, the weighted average is computed. 
Calculation of the correlation weights between peers can 
be performed incrementally by updating the weight for a 
particular peer when additional voting history for that peer 
is received. The use of the persistent storage allows for the 
digital signatures of the statements of peers to only have to 
be verified once (under the assumption that the underlying 
persistent store can be trusted), further increasing efficiency 
of the Credence system. 
2)  Dissemination: Credence utilizes several mechanisms to 
disseminate votes across the system, broadening the influ- 
ence of the votes and allowing voting information to remain 
available even when the original voter is offline. First, vote 
information from neighboring identities is stored persistently 
after each query. The information received from each neigh- 
boring peer also contains information about other peers in the 
network. In this way, the vote from one particular identity can 
disseminate widely across the network as proactive queries are 
made regarding the file. Additionally, gossip-based techniques 
are employed in the background so that voting information for 
unpopular objects has a broader reach throughout.the system. 
In addition to propagating actual voting information regard- 
ing specific files, the system uses a flow-based algorithm, 
similar to the idea behind PageRank [54] and EigenTrust [29], 
to calculate an estimate of the correlation between any two 
indirectly connected identities within the graph. This allows 
larger networks of trust to be built such that strong correlation 
can be established between identities even if they do not vote 
on the same files. Each client builds a local model of a portion 
of the overall trust network and using a gossip-based protocol, 
a node propagates trust along paths from itself to distant peers 
through known painvise relationships. 
3) Defense Mechanisms: The underlying intuition within 
Credence that honest users have similar voting patterns limits 
the impact of any attack pattern. Malicious nodes are forced 
to vote honestly the majority of time so that they can develop 
strong correlation values with other honest users. If the at- 
tackers vote dishonestly, it directly diminishes their correlation 
coefficients with other honest users and lessens their impact on 
the reputation system. Attacks by coalitions of attackers, while 
still effective, are impacted in a similar fashion since they 
require the entire group to establish credible voting patterns 
and inherently more costly for the attackers. 
A key security consideration in the Credence system is the 
use of mechanisms to prevent spoofed votes or votes generated 
by fake identities. The system guards against such attacks by 
issuing digital certificates in an anonymous but semi-controlled 
fashion. The authors propose to mitigate Sybil attacks by 
requiring expensive computation on the part of the client 
before the server grants a new digital certificate. Every voting 
statement is digitally signed by the originator and anyone can 
cryptographically verify the authenticity of any given voting 
statement. 
Honest nodes in Credence occasionally use the inverse of 
votes by nodes with weak correlations based on the fact that 
these votes were most likely submitted by malicious users and 
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VI. RELATED WORK 
A method to categorize peer-to-peer reputation systems is 
presented in [15]. Their work serves as an introduction to 
reputation systems and design issues relating to their use 
in peer-to-peer applications. Unlike their work, we take the 
approach to decompose systems within any context along 
three dimensions, additionally considering the calculation and 
dissemination dimensions. These additional dimensions pro- 
vide further insight into how implementation issues affect the 
effectiveness of the system. Additionally, herein we contribute 
a classification of attack strategies and survey of known 
defense techniques and their strengths and weaknesses. 
In [16] the authors survey trust management in the context 
of peer-to-peer applications. The scope of their survey is 
broader and includes trust management systems that are not 
based on reputation. The authors analyze eight reputation- 
based trust management systems with respect to five types 
of threats and eleven different characteristics. In contrast, in 
this survey we focus solely on reputation systems, allowing 
us to precisely define an analysis framework and attack 
classification specific to reputation systems, and allow us to 
more comprehensively survey the reputation system literature. 
The authors in [17] focus on surveying the calculation 
mechanisms and give greater emphasis to discussing deployed 
systems rather than directly surveying the research literature. 
Their survey is presented in the context of a broader discussion 
of the meaning of trust and reputation. Our work presents a 
broader analysis framework for reputation systems and also 
focuses more on the analysis of attacks against reputation 
systems. 
Reputation systems have also been considered from a 
broader perspective, most prominently in [55]. Therein Del- 
larocas considers the role of reputation systems, their relation 
to more traditional methods of reputation assessment, their 
social and economic impact, and how they can be understood 
in the context of game theory and economics. The work 
gives insights into why reputation systems do or do not work 
from a human perspective and presents how insights from 
management science, sociology, psychology, economics, and 
game theory must be considered beyond computer science 
when designing new reputation systems. Our work is comple- 
mentary: whereas Dellarocas provides insight into the broader 
factors affecting the operational environments of reputation 
systems more from a management perspective, we consider 
the perspective of a system builder and therein provide in- 
sight into the composition of the reputation system itself and 
also a characterization of corresponding threats and defense 
mechanisms. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is the first survey focusing on the design di- 
mensions of reputation systems and the corresponding attacks 
and defenses. We have developed an analysis framework that 
can be used as common criteria for evaluating and comparing 
reputation systems. We have defined an attacker model and 
classified known and other potential attacks on reputation 
systems within this model. Defense mechanisms and their 
corresponding strengths and weaknesses were discussed. We 
have demonstrated the value of the analysis framework and 
attack and defense characterizations by surveying several 
key reputation systems, drawing insights based on the new 
framework. This analysis framework is also valuable for future 
research in that it provides understanding into the implications 
of design choices. 
Reputation systems play an ever-increasingly important part 
in online communities. Understanding reputation systems and 
how they can compare to each other is an important step 
towards formulating better systems in the future. This paper 
has sought to provide more rigorous methods to compare 
existing systems and to bring understanding of these systems 
to a broader audience, including those who build systems that 
rely on reputation systems. 
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